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Images of Representation
Elizabeth Magill

Abstract
This paper is one of a series of papers commemorating Richard Stewart’s important article,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law. Among other things, Stewart’s 1975 article
identified “interest representation” as the central idea that animated a series of important and disparate developments in administrative law doctrine.
This paper unpacks the idea of interest representation and identifies tension in that idea. It does
so by asking a simple question: What is the function of representing interests in administrative
process? The paper argues that, in Stewart’s work and in the law more generally, there are two
distinct answers to that question. One answer is straightforwardly instrumental. The other answer
is not; it is about promoting the legitimacy of administrative governance. The two functions have
different implications for the design of administrative process and judicial review of agency action. After identifying these two functions, the paper turns to the everyday world of administrative
law in an effort to discern which of these two views the law embraces. Examining two areas of
law—standing and prejudicial error—yields two different answers. In one area (standing), the law
embraces a fairly instrumental view of the function of participation; in the other area (prejudicial
error), the law veers more toward a non-instrumental view.
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Images of Representation
M. Elizabeth Magill1

Richard Stewart’s Reformation of American Administrative Law2 both
captured and coined the term “interest representation” for emerging developments
that occurred at a crucial moment in administrative law. Reformation’s interest
representation model rested on three developments: changes in the law of
standing that enlarged the class of persons who had the right to seek judicial
review of agency action; the expansion of participation rights before agencies;
and the judicially imposed requirement that the agency “adequately consider” the
claims put forward by those participants. These developments opened up agency
policymaking to all those—and, in particular, consumers, environmentalists, and
listeners—interested in its formulation, backed by the promise that those who
were ignored by the agency could complain in court that their views were given
short shrift. By everyone’s measure, these were dramatic changes in the law and
Reformation captured, explained, and critically evaluated those changes like no
other work.
The effort to assure meaningful participation in agency decision making
by all interests was not some technical fix to an otherwise well-functioning
machine. As Stewart describes it, the model represented nothing less than a new
justification for the legitimacy of administrative governance. Courts had lost faith
in the older models that had legitimated agency decision making and interest
representation emerged to replace them. Under the new model, courts would
assure that all interested parties could express their views and have them
adequately considered. Stewart relied on a provocative image to capture this idea:
courts had reshaped the agency in the image of the legislature. Regulatory
1
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decisions formulated according to a legislative-style pluralist process would be
legitimate, just as legislative decisions are legitimate.
Assuring that a broad range of interests have a meaningful voice in the
formulation of governmental policy is central to the model Stewart described in
Reformation, just as it is at the center of theorizing about any number of issues.
The need for the people to have a voice in government decision making is taken,
on most political theories, to be a necessary requirement of a legitimate
government. The desire to adequately represent the people’s voice is also evident
in many parts of law and legal thinking. Election law is one obvious place where
the Constitution and statutes incorporate judgments about the nature of political
representation and the design of electoral systems that facilitate representation.
The difficulty of squaring judicial review with democracy is driven by the
concern that judges should not lightly—and, if they must, only under a limited set
of circumstances—overturn the decisions of those who were elected by the
people. In other words, Stewart wrote against a rich background when he
identified meaningful representation of interests as the centerpiece of the new
model of administrative law.
To say that representation of those affected by governance is a theme
running through many schools of thought is not to say that we have a neatly
worked out theory of interest representation. Far from it. In this essay, I will
focus on one tension in our ideas about representation, a tension both evident in
and recognized by Reformation. That tension comes to the surface when one asks
a simple question: What is the function of representing interests in administrative
governance? Reformation identified two impulses that drove the development of
the interest representation model and they, in turn, map on to two different
justifications. As the first part of this essay will draw out, these two images of
representation are distinct and their implications can conflict. One justification
prizes participation for its instrumental effects; the other prizes participation for
the legitimacy it provides to administrative action. The second part of the essay
asks a descriptive question: Which image of representation does the law embrace?
To answer this question, I focus on two areas of the law—standing and prejudicial
error—where courts take a stance on the function of interest representation. The
analysis reveals that the law does not speak with one voice on the function of
representation.
I. WHY REPRESENT INTERESTS?
Reformation itself concisely captured several rationales for the interest
representation model:
Such participation, it is claimed, will not only improve the quality
of agency decisions and make them more responsive to the needs
of the various participating interests, but is valuable in itself
because it gives citizens a sense of involvement in the process of
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government, and increases confidence in the fairness of
government decisions. Indeed, litigation on behalf of widely
shared public interests is explicitly defended as a substitute
political process that enables the citizens to cast a different kind of
vote, [which] informs the court that . . . a particular point of view is
being ignored or underestimated by the agency. Its ultimate aim is
seen as a basic reordering of governmental institutions so that
access and influence may be had by all.3
Here, Stewart identifies both instrumental and non-instrumental justifications for
interest representation. I will draw these justifications out, relying both on
Reformation itself and other developments in administrative law.
Improve Agency Decision Making
The most straightforward reason to require interest representation is the
first one Stewart identifies: to improve agency decision making. An agency
might make an inadequate decision for any number of reasons. It might be
wayward or incompetent; it might lack the requisite information or expertise.
Interest representation counteracts these pathologies.
Guarding against a specific kind of wayward agency behavior is a critical
factor in Stewart’s explanation for courts’ development of the interest
representation model. On Stewart’s telling, courts transformed the law because
they feared that agencies were captured by concentrated interests and, as a result,
their decisions were skewed. Stewart explains that judges developed the new
model of administrative governance “in reaction” to the critique that “agencies are
biased in favor of regulated and client groups, and are generally unresponsive to
unorganized interests.”4
Interest representation, then, is about the lack of
representation of a certain kind of interest—the public interest, or the regulatory
beneficiaries—and the consequent unfairness of agency decisions.
One might also require or permit participation in administrative decision
making for less pessimistic reasons. Such participation could give the agency
access to information or expertise that it does not possess and does not have the
resources to acquire. Countless agency decisions fit this mold. For example,
imagine that the agency has to decide what a standard serving size is for
thousands of food products, but it lacks the technical knowledge or the resources
to gather such information. Non-governmental actors can bring such information
to the table.
These functions of representation in administrative processes do not, as a
logical matter, require comprehensive participation in administrative decision
making as well as judicial evaluation of whether the agency adequately
3
4

Stewart, supra note 2, at 1761 (footnotes and citations omitted).
Stewart, supra note 2, at 1712 (footnotes omitted).
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considered participants’ views. Although these developments traveled together,
one can imagine a regime where agencies are required to invite participation that
does not assign courts the role of policing the quality and fairness of agency
action. Just such an approach can be found in judicial evaluation of social and
economic legislation under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, which
is governed by a rational basis standard. The application of that standard assumes
that there has been formal access to the legislative process, but courts do not
flyspeck the record to determine whether legislators adequately considered the
views of those participants.
If the participation is required in order to overcome the agency’s lack of
information or expertise, then skeptical judicial review would not be necessary.
But requiring a legislative-style pluralist process as well as judicial scrutiny of
that process does make sense if one is convinced that the agency cannot be trusted
to avoid the pathologies that the participation is designed to counteract. The
judicial fear that helped trigger the developments that Stewart describes suggested
that agencies could not be trusted, in which case requiring participation alone
could not cure the problem. Evaluation by some non-agency actor was necessary.
It also bears emphasis that the interest representation model does not, as a
logical matter, lead to improved agency decision making. Whether it does so is
an empirical question, and a complicated one at that. One would first have to
define what counts as improved decision making before one could evaluate the
effects of these developments on agency work product. In 1975,5 Stewart
expressed doubts about the utility of the whole project, and subsequent
scholarship has only deepened skepticism about whether broad participation,
expansive access to judicial examination of agency action, and the adequate
consideration doctrine have actually improved decision making.6
Two implications follow from an instrumental rationale for interest
representation. The right to participate should depend on the parties’ ability to
bring something to the table. It follows from this that if the agency’s decision is
acceptable–imagine that there is only one acceptable outcome under the statute
and an agency has chosen that outcome—then there should be no need for
participation.
Legitimate Agency Governance
While the instrumental reason for participation may be familiar, it is by no
means the only reason offered for interest representation. On another view,
participation serves, not to make the agency decision better as measured against
some correct outcome, but to make that decision acceptable, or legitimate, by dint
5

Stewart, supra note 2, at 1770-76.
See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw and David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety (Harvard 1990);
Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency
Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 173 (1997).
6
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of the process by which it came to be. Stewart identifies some familiar versions
of this rationale. Meaningful participation, he writes, “gives citizens a sense of
involvement in the process of government, and increases confidence in the
fairness of government decisions.”7
But Reformation goes beyond these familiar justifications for involving
the citizenry in governmental decision making. It does so by explaining that the
new model envisions the agency as a mini-legislature—a place where all voices
have an opportunity to be heard. By mimicking the representation of all interests
characteristic of the legislature, the resulting agency action is endowed with the
same legitimacy that attaches to legislative action.8 The idea here is not the
dignity of an individual threatened with injury by the government, but pluralist
exchange, where “interests,” not individuals, get a chance to persuade government
decision makers. Pluralism, that is, applied to administrative process.
The analogy to the legislature is both imaginative and powerful, but it can
also mislead. Its power lies in the fact that the agency process envisioned in the
interest representation model does borrow from the legislature. All those
interested in regulatory policy have their chance to persuade the agency of the
rightness of their views. But, as noted earlier, the administrative-legislature is
different from the legislative-legislature in a crucial respect: The legislative
lobbyist cannot challenge a statute based on the ground that her arguments were
ignored, while the administrative lobbyist can. Courts, applying minimal
constitutional scrutiny, would not hear such an argument about a statute, but
courts applying the “adequate consideration” requirement to an agency rule would
listen. Interested parties may have a right to participate in legislative decision
making, but they do not have a judicially enforceable right to meaningfully
participate.
Reformation’s identification of this legitimacy-based justification for
interest representation should be contrasted with the instrumental rationale
identified earlier.9 Under the instrumental view, interest representation is a way
to improve decision making. At the moment in time Stewart was describing, the
particular instrumental end was the prevention of agency capture. That view
assumes that there are better, or fairer, decisions that agencies can be expected to
reach if only they are forced to adequately consider all the relevant interests.
But the appeal of re-creating the agency in the image of a legislature is
rooted in something quite different. It is animated by a thorough-going
7

Stewart, supra note 2, at 1761.
Stewart, supra note 2, at 1712.
9
In Reformation itself, Stewart recognizes the tension. See Stewart, supra note 2, at 1712 (“The
viability in practice of such a pluralist theory of legitimacy is challenged at the outset by the
predominant contemporary critique of the administrative process: that agencies are biased in favor
of regulated and client groups.”) (footnotes omitted).
8
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pessimism about the existence of right answers. Interest representation is
attractive, as Stewart puts it, because “we have come not only to question the
agencies’ ability to protect the ‘public interest,’ but to doubt the very existence of
an ascertainable ‘national welfare’ as a meaningful guide to administrative
decision.”10 The notion that all the courts can do is assure fair representation of
interests is based on the “assumption that there is no ascertainable, transcendent
‘public interest,’ but only the distinct interests of various individuals and groups
in society.”11 This pluralist vision becomes a stand-in for the earlier models that
legitimated agency action that were no longer sustainable.12 Without those
models or a clearly defined public interest, courts have two choices. They could
permit the agency to select its own version of the right answer, or they could
require the agency to facilitate meaningful participation by those who hold
competing perspectives of the right answer. Courts chose the latter and interest
representation emerged as a new explanation for the legitimacy of agency
decision making. As Stewart describes:
This analysis suggests that if agencies were to function as a forum
for all interests affected by agency decision making, bargaining
leading to compromises generally acceptable to all might result,
thus replicating the process of legislation. Agency decisions made
after adequate consideration of all affected interests would have, in
microcosm, legitimacy based on the same principle as legislation
and therefore the fact that statutes cannot control agency discretion
would become largely irrelevant.13
The logical implications of this view of interest representation are pretty obvious.
A requirement that all interests affected by government decision making must
have a meaningful opportunity to participate in administrative governance
suggests that the right to participate is not dependent on a demonstration that a
group’s participation will improve outcomes; nor should judicial confidence in the
rightness of an agency’s decision obviate the need for such representation.
II.
INTEREST REPRESENTATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
That there are two perspectives on the function of representation in
administrative process may not be a surprise. But our lack of surprise does not
mean we can embrace the two visions simultaneously. They have different
10

Stewart, supra note 2, at 1683.
Stewart, supra note 2, at 1712.
12
Stewart, supra note 2, at 1684 (“Once the function of agencies is conceptualized as adjusting
competing private interest in light of their configuration in a given factual situation and the
policies reflected in relevant statutes, it is not possible to legitimate agency action by either the
‘transmission belt’ theory of the traditional model, or the ‘expertise’ model of the New Deal
period.”)
13
Stewart, supra note 2, at 1712.
11

Magill: Images of Representation

implications for the design of administrative process as well as judicial evaluation
of administrative decision making. The remainder of this essay will underscore
that point by asking a straightforward question: Which image of representation
does the law embrace?
This turns out to be a hard question to answer. There are, to be sure, many
questions about administrative process and judicial review of administrative
action that might require the identification of the function of representation:
When and how should negotiated rulemaking occur? What is the proper role of
White House oversight of legislative rulemaking? When should agencies be
permitted to dispense with notice-and-comment rulemaking? Answering each of
these (and many other) questions might very well require the identification of the
function of participation in administrative process. But one rarely sees an explicit
identification of the function of representation. That may be because, when
addressing these questions, commentators and decision makers are not usually
forced to choose among the perspectives on interest representation.
Concrete legal disputes, however, have a way of forcing such choices.
When an agency has denied meaningful participation to a party, courts are
sometimes asked to set aside the agency action; such cases invite courts to
consider the function of the representation. The rest of this essay focuses on two
areas in administrative law where courts can be read to have taken a stance on the
function of participation in agency decision making. The law in these areas is
illuminating precisely because courts do not embrace both perspectives. In one
area (standing), the Supreme Court clearly endorses the instrumental view of
participation; in another (harmless error), the courts take something closer to the
legitimacy perspective. While analysis of these two areas cannot fully answer the
descriptive question this essay has posed, they are a start toward a full answer.
Standing
Transformations in the law of standing play a crucial role in Stewart’s
account. Indeed, changes that permitted a broader set of interests (such as
regulatory beneficiaries and competitors) to challenge agency action were key
pillars of the model of interest representation that Stewart identified and critiqued.
Those changes might be considered consistent with either perspective on interest
representation, but Stewart describes them as driven by concerns about agency
capture.14 The new standing regime opened the door to parties who were not the
objects of regulatory action and, in that way, could be seen to counteract any
agency tendency to cater to regulated parties.
14

Stewart, supra note 2, at 1728 (“The extension of standing to an increased range of affected
interests is a judicial reaction to the agencies’ perceived failure to represent such interests fairly,
and the consequent perceived need for court review to correct the dereliction.”); id. at 1730
(describing the “governing spirit” of the standing decisions as “a general concern with the inability
of agencies to provide adequate representation to interests other than those of regulated firms”).
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Today’s law of standing looks somewhat different from the law that
Stewart described. In at least in one important way,15 however, current law
accords with an instrumental view of interest representation. Establishing
standing requires the challenger to demonstrate that the governmental action has
harmed a cognizable interest and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
ruling from the court. Consistent with the innovations in standing law that
Stewart described, the list of potentially cognizable injuries continues to be long.
Harm to economic, aesthetic, recreational, conservation, and informational
interests can all, in theory, constitute Article III injuries. And these interests can
be conferred by statute.16
If one takes the legitimacy-based justification for interest representation
seriously, the denial of a right to participate in agency proceedings, even the
denial of a meaningful opportunity to participate in agency proceedings, should
also be a cognizable injury-in-fact. But the Supreme Court has stopped short of
treating a deprivation of a right to participate as an injury-in-fact. In fact, it is
quite clear that such an injury does not count as a cognizable injury.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife17 most clearly makes the point. At issue
was a Department of Interior rule that limited the geographic reach of a key
provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The provision, Section 7,
requires that federal agencies consult with the Secretary of the Interior in order to
assure that federally funded actions are not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of endangered or threatened species or their critical habitat. Interior’s
rule interpreted Section 7 to apply only within the territorial United States or on
the high seas, and not to federal actions taken in foreign nations. To establish
standing, the challengers to the rule pointed to several injuries. They first argued
that Interior’s interpretation would increase the rate of extinction of endangered
and threatened species and that they had a direct interest in the preservation of
such species.18 The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish
15

As Lisa Bressman demonstrates, standing and reviewability doctrines make it difficult for a
party to challenge agency inaction. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency
Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1657 (2004). This makes it more difficult
for regulatory beneficiaries to challenge agency under-enforcement and may reflect a diminished
judicial concern about regulatory capture. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction
After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653, 656 (1985) (“Review at the behest of statutory
beneficiaries may perform a critical function in ensuring against unduly lax enforcement that
would violate statutory requirements. Such requirements may be undone through inadequate
implementation as well as through overzealous enforcement. In both contexts, judicial review
serves to vindicate the will of Congress as against the executive branch and may guard against the
undue influence of powerful private groups over the regulatory process.”)
16
See Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20-21 (1998).
17
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
18
Id. at 562-63.
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that any injury to these interests was actual or imminent19 and a plurality held that
they had failed to establish that any such injury would be redressed by a favorable
ruling.20
But the challengers also presented a distinct claim of injury, one that did
not relate to their interest in species conservation. They claimed that they had
suffered a special kind of injury—a “procedural injury.” Congress had created a
right to a certain procedure (consultation), they argued, and the broad citizen suit
provision of the ESA permitted any person to sue to vindicate a violation of that
procedural right. The Eighth Circuit held that this was an independent claim of
cognizable injury.21
The Supreme Court firmly rejected the procedural injury argument. The
challengers were asserting a “noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive
observe the procedures required by law.”22 Such “a generally available grievance
about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in
proper application of the Constitution and laws”—was not a cognizable Article III
injury.23 Congress could not constitutionally transform this widely shared interest
into an individual right that could be vindicated in Article III courts. The
existence of the citizen-suit provision, in other words, was irrelevant.24
The procedural right at issue in Lujan was an agency obligation to consult
with the Secretary of Interior and thus the procedure did not preserve
Reformation-style interest representation. But many procedural obligations that
agencies are bound to follow are aimed at preserving such participation. For
instance, agencies are required to follow a notice and comment process when they
promulgate a legislative rule. A denial of adequate notice or a denial of a right to
comment would be procedural errors and ones that are at the core of the interest
representation model. The lesson of Lujan is that a challenger attempting to build
a claim of injury solely around an interest in participating in agency decision
making for its own sake—independent of a connection between the procedure and
the protection of a separate concrete and individual interest—would be bringing a
generalized grievance that is not cognizable under Article III.
If there were any doubt about this conclusion based on the nature of the
procedural injury at issue in Lujan, Justice Scalia’s famous (if there can be such a
thing in the law of standing) footnote seven makes this clear:
19

Id. at 564.
Id. at 568-71.
21
Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 121 (8th Cir. 1990)
(“[D]efenders has also satisfied the standing requirement by demonstrating a procedural injury
based upon the Secretary’s failure to follow the required consultation procedures.”).
22
504 U.S. at 573.
23
Id.
24
Id.
20
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There is this much truth to the assertion that procedural rights are
special: The person who has been accorded a procedural right to
protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting
all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy. Thus,
under our case-law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed
construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge
the licensing agency’s failure to prepare the Environmental Impact
Statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty that
the Statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and
even though the dam will not be completed for many years. . . .
What respondents’ “procedural rights” argument seeks, however,
is quite different from this: standing for persons who have no
concrete interests affected—persons who live (and propose to live)
at the other end of the country from the dam.25
Constitutional injury, in other words, requires harm to a concrete interest and
deprivation of a procedural right does not, by itself, count as a concrete interest.26
As the Seventh Circuit put it in denying standing to parties based on an allegedly
unlawful dismissal of an appeal of an agency decision: “A claimed participation
injury cannot alone serve as proxy for the constitutionally required showing of
concrete and particularized harm.”27
Not only is the dismissal of stand-alone procedural injuries as cognizable
bases for injury a rejection of a non-instrumental view of interest representation,
the concrete, individual interest requirement accords with an instrumental view of
interest representation. Parties can have standing to vindicate a right to
participate in agency decision making but only if the denial of the ability to
participate injured some other individual interest—such as their interest in the
environment, their land, or their business. Participation, in other words, is linked
to its instrumental effect.
Prejudicial Error
Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) ends with the
statement that, when courts apply that provision, “due account shall be taken of
the rule of prejudicial error.”28 The two views of representation identified here
would suggest different perspectives on how to apply this harmless error rule
25

504 U.S. at 572, n. 7.
See Bensman v. United States Forest Service, 408 F.3d 945, 955 (7th Cir. 2005) (denial of
statutorily granted right to appeal does not confer standing); Fund for Democracy LLC v. SEC,
278 F.3d 21, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[p]articipation in agency proceedings is alone insufficient to
satisfy judicial standing requirements”).
27
Bensman 408 F.3d at 955.
28
5 U.S.C. §706.
26
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when there has been a denial of such representation. Imagine that a party was
denied the opportunity to meaningfully participate in agency decision making.
For instance, the agency did not provide sufficient notice of its intended action or
did not adequately consider the views presented by a party. Such failures would
deprive parties of central features of Reformation’s interest representation model.
Whether these failures are deemed prejudicial, however, would vary
depending on which perspective one took as to the function of interest
representation. On the instrumental view, the party would need to show that the
agency’s decision would have been different if the party had been allowed to
meaningfully participate. The point of the participation is to improve the agency
decision; if the lack of participation had no effect on the agency decision, then an
old adage should apply: “no harm, no foul.” On the legitimacy-based view,
however, the showing of a denial of meaningful participation should, by itself,
demonstrate prejudice.
Detecting which view the law embraces turns out to be difficult. That is in
part because the harmless error principle has received remarkably little attention
in the literature. Professor Ron Levin’s 1986 characteristically insightful and
incisive restatement of scope-of-review doctrine contains a brief analysis of
harmless error rules for both procedural and substantive errors.29 As to
procedural errors, he notes that “[a]n action shall not be set aside because of a
procedural error that plainly did not influence the outcome of the agency
proceeding.”30 If the error is a failure in the agency’s reasoning, Professor Levin
observes that the error has to be material to warrant a remand to the agency.
Thus, “if an agency’s decision explicitly rests on two alternative and independent
rationales, only one of which is flawed, the court can uphold the decision based
on the other rationale.”31 Or, “if an agency’s rationale is erroneous but the agency
would unquestionably have decided the case the same way if its premises had not
been flawed, remand is unnecessary.”32
Professor Levin’s restatement of harmless error doctrines accords with the
instrumental view of the function of participation. Assume that an agency has
made a procedural error. If it is clear that this failure, as Professor Levin puts it,
“did not influence the outcome of the agency proceedings,” then the error will be
considered harmless. This approach is consistent with the instrumental view of

29

Ronald M. Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report,
38 Admin. L. Rev. 239, 261-63, 282-84 (1986). Richard Pierce’s treatise also discusses harmless
error cases in a variety of parts of the treatise. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law
Treatise §7.3 (“Adequate Notice”) (2002).
30
Id. at 282.
31
Id. at 261.
32
Id.
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participation in that it treats participation as a mechanism for influencing the
outcome of agency decisions.
But in cases where the agency error looks like the denial of a right to
meaningfully participate, the law applied is less hard-edged than this, and as a
result, it tilts toward the legitimacy-based view of participation. To use Professor
Levin’s words, in such cases courts place great emphasis on words like
“plainly”—as in the error is harmless only if the error plainly did not influence the
outcome. In fact, in such cases, courts apply the harmless error rules in ways that
make it very hard for the government to win. Where the agency error is one that
limits participation, the courts presume the existence of prejudice and that
presumption is difficult to overcome.
Several cases illustrate the point. The D.C. Circuit’s McLouth Steel
Products Corp. v. Thomas33 is a good starting place because it has proved
influential. There, a steel manufacturer challenged the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) rejection of the manufacturer’s delisting petition for a type of
waste; the refusal meant that the waste continued to be subject to regulation.
EPA’s decision relied on a model to compute the probable contamination levels of
various substances and that model had not been vetted through a notice-andcomment process. The D.C. Circuit held that this was an error, and then turned
to a discussion of the appropriate remedy. EPA argued that the challenger had not
demonstrated “specific prejudice” from the error.34 Discussing cases that had
placed the burden on the challenger to show prejudice from an agency error, the
court observed that “we think imposition of such a burden on the challenger is
normally inappropriate where the agency has completely failed to comply with
§553.”35 In fact, the D.C. Circuit suggested the presumption ran in the opposite
direction in such a case: “Even if the challenger presents no bases for invalidating
the rule on substantive grounds, we cannot say with certainty whether petitioner’s
comments would have had some effect if they had been considered when the issue
was open.”36 McLouth presumes prejudice by assuming its existence unless it is
shown—with certainty—that there was no prejudice.
In McLouth, the D.C. Circuit relied upon, but described itself as not going
as far as, the Fifth Circuit’s U.S. Steel Co v. EPA.37 There, two companies
challenged EPA’s designation of areas in Alabama as nonattainment areas for
certain pollutants. EPA had not provided notice and permitted comment on this
designation and the Fifth Circuit held that this failure could not be justified.38 It
33
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then determined that the error could not be considered harmless. The court stated
that the doctrine of harmless error was to be used “only ‘when a mistake of the
administrative body is one that clearly had no bearing on the procedure used or
the substance of the decision reached.’”39 Other courts have repeated this
statement of the harmless error rule,40 but it is a perplexing formulation. Treating
as prejudicial all errors that have any effect on the procedure used or the
substance of the decision would make the vast majority of errors harmful, an
approach that is in tension with the statutory command that “due account” be
taken of the rule of prejudicial error.41 But the Fifth Circuit did not actually go so
far. The court declined to deem the error before it harmless. The court did note
that “the Agency’s error plainly affected the procedure used,” but then it noted
that “we cannot assume that there was no prejudice to petitioners” and that the
“[a]bsence of such prejudice must be clear for harmless error to be applicable.”42
In other words, contrary to its earlier statement, the court left open the possibility
that an error that affected the procedure the agency used could be judged
harmless. Although it did not go as far as some of its language suggested, the
Fifth Circuit’s holding does make it difficult to demonstrate that an agency’s
denial of the right to have notice and an opportunity for comment will be deemed
harmless. Like the D.C. Circuit in McLouth, this formulation presumes the
existence of prejudice unless its absence is “clear.”
Perhaps reacting to the strong language in the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, the
D.C. Circuit in McLouth read the U.S. Steel court to have established a “blanket
rule,” something the McLouth court declined to do.43 It is not precisely clear what
“blanket rule” the D.C. Circuit was referring to: the Fifth Circuit’s broad
statement that harmless error could not excuse any error that affected substance or
procedure (which the Fifth Circuit did not actually seem to apply), or that the
absence of prejudice must be “clear” when the agency fails to provide notice and
seek comment. Regardless of this ambiguity, the D.C. Circuit has since read
McLouth to establish a presumption of prejudice when the agency error is a
failure to allow meaningful participation. In Cane Growers Cooperative of
Florida v. Veneman,44 a growers’ association challenged the U.S. Department of
Agriculture’s (USDA) failure to provide notice and permit comment as it
39
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implemented a sugar support program for the 2001 sugar crop. USDA staff had
consulted with interested parties, including the challengers, in as many as a dozen
informal sessions as they prepared to implement the 2001 program. USDA
employees had stated in those sessions that they would implement the program
through a notice-and-comment process. But USDA ultimately did not provide
notice and seek comment; it only issued a notice of program implementation.
The government argued that the challengers suffered no prejudice because
they could not “identify any additional arguments they would have made in a
notice-and-comment procedure that they did not make to the Department in the
several informal sessions.”45 Notice that even the government’s formulation of
the rule falls far short of an outcome-determinative test for harmless error. Under
its proposed approach, the challengers would just have to point to an argument
they would have made—not that the argument would have had any traction—if
the procedure had been different. Even so, the D.C. Circuit firmly rejected the
government’s argument as too government-friendly. Relying on McLouth, the
court stated that “an utter failure to comply with notice and comment cannot be
considered harmless if there is any uncertainty at all as to the effect of that
failure.”46 According to the court, acceptance of the government’s argument
“would have us virtually repeal section 553’s requirement” because, under the
government’s test, the “government could skip those procedures, engage in
informal consultation, and then be protected from judicial review unless a
petitioner could show a new argument—not presented informally” and, hence,
“section 553 obviously would be eviscerated.”47
The Ninth Circuit’s Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan48 discusses in
perhaps the most colorful terms the reasons why courts are hesitant to judge
agency denials of participation harmless. At issue was the longstanding USDA
process for establishing agriculture marketing orders; the orders at issue limited
the quantity of navel oranges shipped from one market to another. In developing
these marketing orders, the USDA first established a marketing plan before the
start of the season that estimated the weekly volume restrictions that would be
necessary. Once the season started, week-by-week determinations were made that
took account of the changing market conditions. In developing both the preseason projections and the weekly orders, USDA relied heavily on the
recommendations of a committee composed of industry representatives and one
person from outside the industry. The weekly limits were established after this
committee consulted with interested parties, held a public meeting, and made a
45
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recommendation to USDA. After receiving the recommendation, the USDA
published a rule in the Federal Register each Friday that set the volume restriction
for the following week. The USDA rules, which clearly had not been adopted in
compliance with the APA requirements for legislative rules, asserted that it would
be “impracticable and contrary to the public interest” to do so.49
Navel orange handlers challenged the process used to formulate the
weekly marketing orders. The court held that the USDA failed to justify its
unorthodox process and it thus could not be used in the future. The court then
turned to the question whether the prior violations were harmless (an important
question given a pending forfeiture proceeding against the challengers to the rule).
Judge Kozinksi had opened the opinion with the colorful statement that
“[p]rocedure, not substance, is what most distinguishes our government from
others.”50 This foreshadowed his description of why judges must be exceedingly
careful in applying harmless error rules to agency failures of this sort. As the
opinion explained:
It’s true, as plaintiff’s argue, that we must exercise great caution in
applying the harmless error rule in the administrative rulemaking
context. The reason is apparent: Harmless error is more readily
abused there than in the civil or criminal trial context. An agency
is not required to adopt a rule that conforms in any way to the
comments presented to it. So long as it explains its reasons, it may
adopt a rule that all commentators think is stupid or unnecessary.
Thus, if the harmless error rule were to look solely to result, an
agency could always claim that it would have adopted the same
rule even if it had complied with the APA procedures. To avoid
gutting the APA’s procedural requirements, harmless error analysis
in administrative rulemaking must therefore focus on the process
as well as the result.51
After statements like this, however, the Ninth Circuit held the USDA’s departures
from the requirements of the APA harmless. The main reason seems to be that all
parties, including the challengers, were aware of and participated in the USDA
process for decades. As the court put it, “While they are right that the Secretary
must comply with some of the technical requirements, their belated challenge is
evidence of the lack of prejudice resulting from the Secretary’s failure to do so in
the past thirty-five years.”52 To describe USDA’s violations as technical is a real
stretch. But the court was clearly of the view that challengers were not denied
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any real right to participate; they had been participating, and actively so, for
decades.53
It is not simple to extract general legal principles from these cases because
courts resist them. Nonetheless, where the agency error is a denial of a right to
participate in agency proceedings, the courts are extremely hesitant to treat the
error as harmless. When faced with an error of this sort, courts presume the
existence of prejudice. While they leave open the possibility that the error can be
harmless, establishing that is difficult: the absence of prejudice must be “plain” or
“clear.”
The approach in these cases cannot be squared with a hard-headed
outcome determinative approach to harmless error. A denial of participation in
agency proceedings does not have to be shown to affect the outcome of the
proceeding in order for it to be judged prejudicial. Under Veneman, participants
do not even need to point to additional or different arguments they would have
made if the procedure had been different. This sort of reasoning does not tie
participation to its instrumental effects on agency decision making. Instead, the
courts are protecting a right to participate independent of those effects. One can
thus read them as protecting participation for participation’s sake and, as such,
embracing a legitimacy-based view of the function of participation in agency
processes.
CONCLUSION
This brief essay has identified and separated out two different pictures of
interest representation. The two justifications—or, as I have called them here,
images—are familiar, as is the fact that they have different implications. But the
tension between the two can be seen with particular clarity in administrative law.
The instrumental view embraces one view about the function of participation, the
legitimacy-based view suggests another. The latter part of this essay has
grounded this familiar tension between instrumental and non-instrumental aims in
a concrete context: the every-day world of administrative law. Examining two
questions that arise regularly as judges consider challenges to administrative
action, the essay identifies which view of representation the courts embrace and at
the same time underscores the distinct implications of the two conceptions. While
the answer produced by this analysis is only the beginning of a full answer to the
descriptive question posed here, it is nonetheless instructive. It focuses our
attention on the unavoidable conflict in our twin justifications for participation.
Perhaps, too, it will have the added benefit of encouraging clear-headed thinking
about the function of participation across a range of questions that arise in public
law.
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